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ABSTRACT
"Designing in Safety" is a desired part of the development
of any new potentially hazardous system, process, or facility. It
is a required part of nuclear safety activities as specified in the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 420.\B, Facility
Safety. This order addresses the design of nuclear related
facilities developed under federal regulation IOCFR830,
Nuclear Safety Management. IOCFR830 requires that safety
basis documentation be provided to identify how nuclear safety
is being adequately addressed as a condition for system
operation (e.g., the safety basis). To support the development
of the safety basis, a safety analysis is performed.
Although the concept of developing a design that
addresses 'Safety is simple, the execution can be complex and
challenging. This paper addresses those complexities and
challenges for the design activity of a system to treat sludge, a
corrosion product of spent nuclear fuel, at DOE's Hanford Site
in Washington State. The system being developed is referred to
as the Sludge Treatment Project (STP). This paper describes
the portion of the safety analysis that addresses the selection of
design basis events using the experience gained from the STP
and the development of design requirements for safety features
associated with those events. Specifically, the paper describes
• PacificNorthwest National Laboratory is operated by Battelle for the
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the safety design process and the application of the process for
two types of potential design basis accidents associated with
the operation of the system, I) flashing spray leaks and 2)
splash and splatter leaks. Also presented are the technical
challenges that are being addressed to develop effective safety
features to deal with these design basis accidents.
INTRODUCTION
The 105K East (KE) and 105K West (KW) Basins at the
Hanford Site, were built in the early 1950s for storing the spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) under water. In 1992, the decision to
deactivate the remaining fuel reprocessing facility left SNF in
the 105K Basins with no means ofnear-term processing. In the
1990s, projects began working to remove SNF from the basin
and place it in dry storage until the fuel could be processed and
placed in final storage. In the interim, corrosion products from
the degrading fuel, corroding storage racks, concrete particles
from the pool walls, and environmental particulates
accumulated as sludge on the floors and pits of the 105K
Basins. In addition, sludge was generated during handling and
cleaning of SNF canisters during removal of fuel from the
basins.
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In order to remove the approximately 54 m' of sludge from
the K Basins and disposition it for disposal, the STP is being
developed to retrieve sludge from the 105K Basins and transfer
it to the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF). In the CVDF,
the sludge will be corroded in a corrosion vessel, assayed, and
grouted in drums for final disposal.
The l05K Basins are currently classified as a Hazard
Category 2 Facility per DOE-SID-2007-92, Hazard
Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for
Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis
Reports and therefore, require developing a 10CFR830 safety
basis. The 10CFR830 safety basis requires the identification of
design basis accidents (DBAs) for the purpose of developing
controls to manage the risks associated with the potential
release of radioactive material from the corrosion and grouting
process. These controls include safety related Structures,
Systems, and Components (SSCs) and potential Technical
Safety Requirements (TSRs).
DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT IDENTIFICATION
The analysis process to identify DBAs starts with a hazard
analysis, which is maintained for the evolving design. The
hazard analysis identifies ways in which uncontrolled releases
of radioactive/hazardous material from the STP process can
potentially occur. The hazard analysis of the STP is focused on
hazardous conditions that could lead to exposure of facility
workers, onsite workers (workers located 100m from the
facility), or the public located off-site, due to releases of
radioactive sludge and basin water. The information gathered
during the hazard analysis is used throughout the design
evolution and safety analysis process when establishing
accident types, defining the spectrum of accidents, and
supporting the assumptions used in accident analysis and the
safety-control selection process.
Hazard analysis techniques were selected from the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers handbook,
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (AIChE 1992).
For the STP, the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) study and
the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study techniques were
used to identify potential hazardous conditions and estimate
their potential harm. Both the PHA and HAZOP techniques are
systematic brainstorming processes using a multidisciplinary
team of knowledgeable individuals. Results are captured on
worksheets, which aid the brainstorming process and are
reviewed by the tearn after completion. Because these
assessments arc to be qualitative in nature, the expertise and
experience ofthe team is of primary importance in establishing
the credibility of the analysis. The tearn consisted of facility
personnel with knowledge of operations, engineering, nuclear
safety, radiation protection, fire protection, industrial safety,
and environmental safety.
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Each hazardous condition was assigned an accident group
according to the nature of the condition for the purpose of
selecting DBAs. Two steps comprise the accident selection
process:
1. Identification and assignment of accident groups to
each hazardous condition
2. Selection of bounding and representative accidents
for each accident type for quantitative evaluation via
accident analysis. These accidents are referred to as
DBAs as defined in DOE-S1D-3009-94, Preparation
Guide for u.s. Department of Energy. Nonreactor
Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses.
The objectives of the accident selection process were to
identify a minimum set of accidents that represent and bound
the hazardous conditions for the accident group and control set
to which they were assigned.
Only accidents with the potential for moderate or high
impacts to the offsite and onsite receptors were analyzed
quantitatively during accident analysis activities. Other types
of accidents (e.g., facility worker safety impacts and
environmental releases) were addressed qualitatively. Based on
this analysis process, the list of DBAs for STP includes:
Operational Events:
• Steam Flash - Catastrophic and Guillotine Pipe
Rupture
• Stearn Flash - Small Flashing Spray Leak
• Splash and Splatter Leak
• Spray Leak
• Overpressure Release
• Flammable Gas Deflagration
• Fire
External Events:
• Fire
• Vehicle Impact
• Nitrogen Supply System Overpressurization
For each DBA, preventive control strategies have been
defined (note that in the case of fires, the controls do not
prevent a fire from occurring, but are credited with preventing
uncontrolled releases initiated by a fire).
CONTROL IDENTIFICATION
Control identification is an iterative process that requires
information from both the hazard analysis and the accident
analysis. The hazard analysis provides the initial set of
hazardous conditions requiring controls, based on the
qualitative risks assigned. The need for controls is based on
criteria agreed upon by DOE and the contractor developing and
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operating STP. The accident analysis provides quantitative
values for frequency and consequence for the DBAs without
consideration of controls. Once the accident analysis without
controls has been completed, a risk assignment can be
verified/modified and the need for the previously identified
controls and their assigned safety levels can be verified. Final
safety levels are assigned to the controls based on the
comparison of the consequences to the radiological evaluation
guidelines. The preference for identification of controls is as
follows:
• Preventiveover mitigative.
• Passive controlsover active,
• Engineered controls over administrative controls,
• . Controls with the highest reliability,
• Controls closest to the hazard.
Controls are initially identified for each DBA and then
additional controls are identified, as required, for the remaining
hazardous conditions represented by that DBA (e.g., all the
conditions in the same accident group as the DBA).
DESIGNING CONTROLS
Functional requirements for controls come from a variety
of sources. Each control identified has associated safety
function(s). These safety function(s) lead to a set of functional
requirements for each control. For example, if a vessel liquid
level control has a safety function of "Prevent a release of
material by terminating transfer of material prior to vessel
overflow", functional requirements would be developed for
response time for this control to take into account response
time and residual run out in the system. The design must meet
all ofthe functional requirements defmed.
In addition to the functional requirements related to the
safety function(s), there are requirements related to the
environment(s) of potential accidents. DOE 0 420.1B, Facility
Safety, Chapter l. Nuclear And Explosives Safety Design
Criteria Section 3.b(7), "Design Requirements," requires that
controls be designed so they can perform their safety function
when called upon to operate. DOE G 420.1-1, Nonreactor
Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety Criteria
Guide for Use With DOE 0 420.1, Facility Safety, further
slates:
• Controls must be designed to reliably perform their
safety function under those conditions and events for
which their safety function is intended.
• Controls must be designed to withstand, all design
basis loadings with an appropriate margin of safety.
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• Environmental qualification must be used to ensure
that controls can perform all safety functions, as
determined by the safety analysis, with no failure
mechanism that could lead to common cauae failures
under postulated service conditions.
• The design of control instrumentation and control
systems must incorporate sufficient independence,
redundancy, diversity, and separation to ensure that all
safety-related functions associated with such
equipment can be performed under postulated accident
conditions as identified in the safety analysis.
• Controls must be designed to specified national
consensus codes or DOE-approved equivalents.
Because a preventive SSC prevents a specific DBA from
occurring, there is typically no accident condition associated
with that specific DBA to which the preventive SSC is
exposed. Rather, preventive controls must be designed to
perform their intended safety function under normal and
abnormal operating conditions with an appropriate margin of
safety. The exception to this slatement is where there are
multiple preventive sses (or multiple components of a
preventive SSC) for the same accident wherein the failure of a
second preventive SSC would result in increased consequences
from the accident. Furthermore, it is important to note that
preventive controls may be required to perform their safety
function for accidents other than those which they are credited
with preventing. For example, controls credited with
preventing the Small Flashing Spray Leak DBA must perform
their safety function given the mitigated Operational -Fire
DBA.
Safety SSCs with a mitigative safety function have been
identified for some DBAs, These mitigative SSCs provide
significant defense-in-depth in the event that the preventive
controls fail. Mitigative controls are exposed to accident
conditions and must be designed to reliably perform their safety
function given these conditions.
The following sections present the design challenges faced
for two STP controls. The controls and DBAs are as follows:
• CVDF Local Exhaust System: Small Flashing
Spray Leak
• Assay Vessel Level Detection System: Splash and
Splatter Leak
DESIGN OF CVDF LOCAL EXHAUST SYSTEM FOR
SMALL FLASHING SPRAY LEAK
The purpose of the STP corrosion process is to stabilize the
sludge. This is achieved by reacting uranium metal with hot
water at high pressure and temperature to form uranium oxides
and hydrogen according to the following reactions:
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U +2H,o-V02 +2H2
3V +8H20_VJO,+8H2
This reaction process is expected to produce significant
respirable sized solids from the uranium oxidation. The
corrosion process is designed to operate at approximately 225
psig and 365' F.
The hazards analysis identified the potential for small
cracks (small leaks) in the Corrosion Vessel during the
corrosion process resulting in a flashing spray leak (-1500
gallon batch volume). A flashing spray is defined as a water jet
that is superheated above a critical temperature that results in
shattering the jet due to vapor expansion. A flashing spray can
result in releasing high respirable fractions of water droplets.
Brown and York (1962), and others, have identified that the
critical temperature for water jets is -18 'F (-10 'C ) superheat
(i.e., 18 'F superheat above the ambient pressure, saturation
temperature) to initiate thermal shattering of the jet. The water
jets identified for this accident group have up to -100 'F
. superheat. Thus, thermal shattering would be expected to be
quite vigorous for such an event. Small flashing spray leaks
have been defined as on the order of < 0.08-O.l2in2 (50-
8Omm2) area [<0.31-0.39in (8-IOmm) equiv. diameter]. At 225
psig, this is the size that could drain the vessel contents in I hr,
or longer (for a leak below the liquid level, assuming an
initially full vessel).
To protect against small flashing spray leaks, a suite of
controls were identified to prevent the initiating events (i.e.;:
excessive temperature, over pressure excursions, liquid
nitrogen intrusion) and to provide defense-in-depth additional
controls where identified to mitigate the radiological
consequences in the event of an accidental release. The
preventive strategy includes the design of the Corrosion
Pressure Vessel Pressure Boundary and associated SSCs to
maintain structural integrity in normal operating andoff-normal
environments. As a defense-in-depth control, the CVOF Local
Exhaust System is part of the mitigative strategy.
The CVDF Local Exhaust System draws -1300 cfm of air
from the CVOF process bay and 1500 cfm from the process
equipment including the Corrosion Vessel. The system uses a
IO-in.-diameter exhaust ducting, which runs through the
process bay wall into the mechanical equipment room where
four other branches join for a combined exhaust of -5100 cfm,
The combined exhaust flow is routed through the exhaust filter
plenum, which provides two stages of high-efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) filtration. The system has two fans
mounted in parallel downstream of the filter plenum: one fan
operating and the second on standby. The standby fan will
automatically start if the first fan fails. Running either fan is
sufficient to provide the necessary airflows for the system.
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Filtered exhaust is directed to a common header, with the
general facility exhaust and to the stack.
The designated Safety Function of the CVDF Local
Exhaust System is to "Mitigate the release of sludge for the
Corrosion Vessel Pressure Boundary Secondsry Confinement
in the event of a small flashing spray from the Corrosion Vessel
Pressure Boundary."
DOE 0420.1-1 specifies the use of the following codes
and standsrds for the design of ventilation systems credited as
providing significant defense-in-depth against a design basis
accident:
• SMACNA Manual
• ASHRAE Handbook
• ASHRAE-52.1;
• MIL-F-51068F;
• ANSIIASME-NS09 and N510;
• DOE NE STD-F3-45
Functional Requirements identified for this safety function
include providing confinement of the released material (in
conjunction with the CVOF building structure) and providing
filtration (removal efficiency of 99% for respirable radioactive
particulates) prior to discharge to the environment.
The small flashing spray could result in the release of a
significant mass (more than 100 kg) of respirable sludge
particulates due to entrainment in the flashing water jet. Upon
thermal shattering of the water jet, the respirable particulates
are carried to the HEPA filters via the ventilation exhaust
stream. The nominal maximum loading for a HEPA filter is
approximately 600 grams.
In addition to the respirable particulates, the small flashing
spray produces up to 1200 cfm of steam. The CVOF Local
Exhaust system must maintain a net inflow from the outside
environment to support its confmcment function. To protect
the HEPA filters, a 70% humidity setpoint has been established
to shutdown theCVOF Local Exhaust fans. The steam
resulting from the small flashing spray leak combined with the
normal exhaust streams results in an exhaust stream which
could exceed the 70% huntldity setpoint.
The above performance requirements place significant
demands on the CVDF Local Exhaust System, as such,
additional analysis is being performed to determine the
potential benefit of operational changes (lower temperature and
pressure), as well as design options to reduce the impacts of the
release with respect to the CVDF Local Exhaust System or
reconsideration of the ability to credit this system for the
identified DBA. .
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DESIGN OF ASSAY VESSEL LEVEL· DETECTION
SYSTEM FOR SPLASH AND SPLATTER LEAK
Within the S1P process, an Assay System is utilized to
determine the activity of the treated sludge to the volume
packaged in each drum to meet radioactive waste acceptance
criteria. The vessel that is used in this process (Assay Vessel)
has a -38 gallon batch volume/-50 total volume. The hazards
analysis process identified the potential for overflows during
transfers from the Corrosion Vessel (-1500 gallon batch
volume) or from the flush water system (-500 gallon makeup
vessel volume). The transfer line is 1.5 inches in diameter and
transfers into the top of the vessel (high point above the vessel
head is yet to be determined).
To prevent this hazard, the Assay Vessel Level Detection
System was identified with the following safety function:
"Prevent overflows by detecting (high) liquid level within the
Assay Vessel and terminating all liquid transfers to the Assay
Vessel prior to the release of radioactive material due to
overfilling the vessel."
DOE 0420.1-1 specifies the use of the following codes
and standards for the design of instrumentation and control
systems credited to protect against the consequences of the
Splash and Splatter Leak DBA for the Assay System:
• ~A-70,-110;
• ANSIC2;
• ANSIIISA-Series;
• ANSJlIEEE*-14I, -142, -242, -493, -1050
°ANSJlIEEE standards should be considered for
instrumentation, control. and 'alarm components without
necessarily invoking all ofthe Safety Class IE requirements.
The high-high level sensor was set at a level
corresponding to - 41.8 gal. This set point, approximately 10%
above the working volume, is necessary to allow for
fluctuations in level due to agitation. The vessel volume above
the high-high level set point is therefore -8.2 gal. The assay
vessel high-high level sensor has an accuracy of within 0.25 in.
(0.2 gal). Given that the maximum liquid flow rate into the
assay vessel is 38.6 gpm (maximum flow rate of the flush water
pump), the system would be required to operate to accomplish
pump shutdown or isolation valve closure in less than 12
seconds to prevent vessel overflow. This time must include the
detection of the event, processing of the signal, and actuation of
pump shutdown (or valve closure). This time ignores the
transfer line holdup and pump rundown time. Actual line
lengths are not known at this time but could potentially impact
the allowable response time significantly, as liquid holdup
within the transfer line is approximately I gallon per foot.
Thus depending upon detailed layout and line routing
information the Safety Function may be revised to be
mitigative (minimize the amount of material potentially
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released); the batch and high level volumes reduced to provide
for a larger reserve volume; or, transfer line routings revised to
minimize holdup.
CONCLUSIONS
Design of the control sets requires an iterative process.
This iteration consists of the following:
• The initial set of proposed controls and functional
requirements must be reviewed in an integrated
manner considering the design; accident analysis, and
the functional capabilities of the proposed control.
• Additional functional requirements not initially
identified may be developed as a result of this process.
• These new requirements must then be evaluated
against control identification criteria, design
requirements, and the capabilities of the SSCs.
• Evenwith the application of national consensus codes
and standards, engineering analysis is required to
assure that the selected controls are appropriately
designed to successfully operate in the environments
associated with the DBAs and represented hazardous
conditions.
• A change in control strategy (e.g., from preventive to
mitigative) may be necessary after a design
performance analysis of the control is completed,
based on the final system design characteristics.
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